Missouri Law Review
Volume 63
Issue 4 Fall 1998

Article 3

Fall 1998

Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Some
Facts Worth Knowing
J. Lee Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
J. Lee Johnson, Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Some Facts Worth Knowing, 63
MO. L. REV. (1998)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Johnson: Johnson: Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:

Comment

A Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Some Facts Worth Knowing
I. INTRODUCTION

As U.S. companies do business in an ever increasing global economy, they
risk being caught in a legal dilemma. A World Bank survey of 3,600 firms in
sixty-nine nations revealed that forty percent of businesses are paying bribes.'
Fifteen percent of businesses in industrial countries pay bribes while the
percentage in the former Soviet Union is a staggering sixty percent.2 From these
statistics, it is clear that bribery is a way of doing business in much of the world.
U.S. companies eager to do business in foreign countries may be tempted to pay
the necessary bribes to various foreign officials in an effort to secure contracts.
Unfortunately for these companies, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act may prove
to be an impenetrable barrier standing between the American company and the
contract.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act forbids the bribery of foreign officials
with few exceptions. In addition, the Act imposes accounting requirements on
many U.S. companies. This legislation is to be taken seriously, as Lockheed
found in 1995 when it was forced to pay $24.8 million in penalties for bribing
an Egyptian official.3
This Comment will first address the history leading up to the'adoption of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. A discussion of the provisions ofthe Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act will follow. Next is an analysis of cases interpreting the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This is followed by a discussion of the
difficulties particular to transitional economies, such as Russia, and developing
countries such as China. Finally, this Comment will discuss ways a U.S.
business can avoid running afoul of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

1. Thomas Omestad, Bye-Bye to Bribes: The Industrial World Takes Aim at
Official Corruption,U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1997, at 42.

2. Id.
3. Martha Groves, Careers / Ethics at Work:

Honor System Even in an

Increasingly Competitive Business Climate, Some Firms are Finding that It Pays to
Focus on Doing the Right Thing, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1997, at D23. Lockheed paid the

bribes in an effort to secure the contract for certain planes. Id. As will be seen below,
Lockheed's earlier practices substantially contributed to the passing of the Foreign

Corrupt Practices Act.
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II. HISTORY LEADING UP TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The American disaster known as Watergate eventually led to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.4 Besides the affairs that led to the downfall of the Nixon
administration, investigators began examining political corruption generally.
Corporate* slush funds 5 were a major focus of these investigations. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became involved in the matter and
soon discovered something it had not expected-the money in the slush funds
was being used to bribe foreign officials in order to gain business.' Over four
hundred companies admitted to making payments to foreign officials for this
purpose. In all, more than three hundred million dollars exchanged hands in the
1960s and 1970s.8 The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was among the more
prominent examples, giving more than thirty million dollars to various foreign
officials between 1961 and 1975.2 Bribes to foreign officials have also been
credited for the serious problems faced by the governments of Japan, The
Netherlands, and Italy."
The SEC's first response to this crisis was to implement a procedure of
voluntary disclosure. By voluntarily disclosing questionable payments, a
corporation could gain some immunity if it would agree not to make such
payments in the future and to maintain an accounting system that would make
any bribes identifiable." Though this procedure appeared to be a step in the
right direction, it was not perfect. The independent investigators sometimes

4. See Lisa Harriman Randall, Note, Multilateralizationof the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657,658 (1997).
5. A slush fund was an account that was off the books and enabled the company
to make payments to gain influence in the United States. See Mark J. Murphy,
InternationalBribery: An Example of an Unfair TradePractice?,21 BROOKLYN. J.INT'L
L. 385,392 (1995).
6. Randall, supranote 4, at 658.
7. Brett Witter, Note, Lamb v Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990):
The Sixth Circuit Gets Sheepish on Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Enforcement, 5
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 533,535 (1992).
8. Id.
9. Id. Lockheed was by no means the only fortune 500 company to be involved
in these activities. Exxon paid more than $56 million and Northrup more than $30
million. JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HUsIsIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 24 n.77 (1997) (citing
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, 1 (Comm'n Print 1976)).

10. Randall, supranote 4, at 658.
11. Randall, supra note 4, at 661-62. In addition, the corporation was required to
assign an independent investigator to look into the matter. Randall, supranote 4, at 662.
After making a report to the corporation's board, the independent investigator released
his or her findings to the public. Randall, supra note 4, at 662.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/3
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received little cooperation from the corporations. 2 In addition, the Freedom of
Information Act required the SEC to make investigatory records public, resulting
in the leak of confidential corporate information.13 Finally, these requirements
of disclosure obviously only reached those entities governed by the SEC.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was unanimously passed by Congress
in 1977." This put the United States ahead of the rest of the world governments
in stamping out corruption. 5 Not only do other countries not prohibit bribery of
foreign officials, many, such as Germany, actually allow the bribe to be deducted
as a business expense. 6
To date, the U.S. is the only country to criminalize the paying of bribes to
foreign officials; 7 however, that may soon change. The Organization of
American States adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption of
the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1996.' The OAS agreement
obligates the member states to prohibit payments to foreign officials. 9
More recently, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) agreed in November of 1997 to a pact that takes real steps
toward eliminating the bribery of foreign officials." In addition to the twentynine members of OECD, the agreement involves Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, and the Slovak Republic.2' The treaty requires members to adopt a
definition of bribery that is similar to the definition under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.' Additionally, members must impose criminal penalties on
people or businesses who bribe foreign officials.2? Finally, the treaty provides
that the proceeds and profits ofbribes (including any transactions resulting from
a bribe) can be confiscated.24 Though some have criticized the OECD treaty as
not going far enough,' it is at least a step in the right direction.

12. Randall, supra note 4, at 664.
13. Randall, supra note 4, at 664.
14. BIALoS & HUsIsIAN, supra note 9, at 24.
15. BIALOs & HUslsIAN, supra note 9, at 26-27.
16. Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct and the
OECDAnti-briberyRecommendation: When MoralSuasion Won't Work; Try theMoney
Argument, 14 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 207, 234 (1996).
17. BIALOS & HusisAN, supra note 9, at 26.
18. Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, CulturalDifferences in the CrusadeAgainst
InternationalBribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign CorruptPractices
Act, 6 PAc. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 549,553 (1997).
19. Id. at 553-54.
20. Jack Nelson, Nations to'FightCommercialBribery, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 21,

1997, at A3.
21. EU/OECD: OECDBrokers Agreement on Bribery,EUROPEAN REP., Nov. 26,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 13048009.
22. Nelson, supranote 20, at A3.

23. Nelson, supranote 20, at A3.
24. Nelson, supra note 20, at A3.

25. For example, the treaty does not prohibit bribes to political party officials.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 3

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 63

There may be hope for change even in Africa, where bribery and corruption
is considered by many td be at its highest
level. Six African countries have
26
expressed there intent to end bribery.
Finally, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have also
taken steps to discourage bribery.27 The day seems to be rapidly approaching
28
when the United States will not be alone in its stand against bribery.
III. THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has provisions applicable to two
different categories-issuers and domestic concerns. The term "issuer" includes
those companies "which ha[ve] a class of securities registered pursuant to section
781 of this title [Section 15 of the Securities Exchange] or which is required to
file reports under section (78o(d)) of this title."29 A "domestic concern" is
defined in the act as "any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the
United States, and any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock
company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship
which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is
organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession,
or commonwealth of the United States."3 One can clearly see that the FCPA
has an extremely broad reach.

Anne Swardson, 34 Nations Promise to Curb Bribery: Treaty to Cover Some Foreign
Officials, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1997, at A16. In addition, the treaty allows nations to'

grant tax deductions for bribes. Id. Finally, the treaty does not require the official taking
the bribe to be punished. Id.
26. Ungreasingthe Palm, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 20, Nov. 14, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 2805240.
27. Id. The World Bank does not finance projects that are not clearly free from
bribery. Id. The IMF stops its funding once it discovers some of its money has been
diverted to private parties. Id.
28. Several reasons have been put forth as explaining why a multi-lateral
prohibition against the bribery of foreign officials has been largely unforthcoming. One
of the chief reasons is the fact the definition of "bribery" various from country to country.
Kim & Kim, supra note 18, at 557. This makes it very hard to develop a universal
consensus as to what constitutes "bribery." In addition, many countries find the pressure
to prohibit bribery of foreign officials offensive, seeing it as an impingement on their

sovereignty. Kim & Kim, supranote 18, at 558. These countries believe that the foreign
country where the officials are accepting the bribes should be the country to deal with the
situation. Kim & Kim, supranote 18, at 558. In addition they are resentful of what they
see as an attempt by the United States to impose its values on their country. Kim & Kim,
supra note 18, at 558.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1994).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/3
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In addition to denoting two categories of potential defendants, the FCPA
attacks bribery in two different ways-through accounting and anti-bribery
provisions.
A. Accounting Provisions
The FCPA imposes certain accounting requirements on issuers by
amending the Securities Exchange Act. The accounting provisions are only
applicable to issuers, so domestic concerns need not worry about them.3' The
FCPA requires issuers to "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which,
in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer." 32 In addition, issuers are required to
establish a system whereby there are "reasonable assurances" that company
action is properly authorized.33 The terms "reasonable assurances" and
"reasonable detail" mean the "level of detail and degree of assurance as would
satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs. ' 34
To be criminally liable under these provisions, an issuer must "knowingly
circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting
controls or knowingly falsify any book record or account."35 This assures that
companies need not fear liability for inadvertent errors.
In addition to the protection from inadvertent errors, the FCPA provides
protection for the issuer who owns less than fifty percent of another business.36
A United States corporation will not be liable under the accounting provisions
for the actions of other businesses (foreign or domestic) so long as the issuer
makes a good faith attempt to secure FCPA compliance.3 7
The purpose of the accounting provisions is to prevent the buildup of "slush
funds" that were used in the past to make questionable payments.3 8 An

31. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1994).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1994). Whether a company's control structure is
sufficient is determined by the SEC using a variety of factors, including the following:
"(1) role of the board of directors, (2) communication of corporate procedures and
policies, (3)assignment of authority and responsibility, (4) competence and integrity of
personnel, (5) accountability for performance and for compliance with policies and
procedures, and (6)objectivity and effectiveness of the internal audit function." Michael
D. Nilsson, Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 803, 806 (1996) (citing
SEC Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rules Regarding Statement of Management on
Internal Accounting Controls, 45 Fed Reg. 40,135, 40,139 to 40,143 (1980)).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (1994).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (1994).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1994).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1994).
38. Lisa Harriman Randall, Note, Multilaterlization of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657, 666 (1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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important aspect of the accounting requirements under the FCPA is that all
issuers must comply with them, whether or not they do any foreign business.39
B. Anti-BriberyProvisions
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA apply to both issuers and domestic
concerns. Though these provisions are codified separately (15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1
for issuers and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 for domestic concerns), they are virtually
identical. The FCPA prohibits:
1. Certain issuers of U.S. securities, domestic concerns, the
officers, directors, employees, and agents thereof, stockholders acting
on behalf of such firms, and U.S. individuals;
2. from making use of the mails or some other means of
interstate commerce;
40
3. corruptly;

4. in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to give, or an
41

authorization of an offer, payment, or gift;

5. to any foreign official, foreign political party, or candidate for
political office;42
6. for the purpose of either (i) influencing any act or decision of
that foreign official or (ii) inducing that official to use influence to
affect or influence any act of a foreign government or its
instrumentality in order to assist such issuer or domestic concern in
directing business to any person or in obtaining or retaining business
with any person.4'

39. Nilsson, supra note 33, at 805.
40. The term "corrupt" is not defined in the statute. However, legislative history
defines the term to mean "a purpose to induce the recipient to misuse his official position
in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential
legislation or a favorable regulation," and "connotes an evil motive or purpose, and intent
to wrongfully influence the recipient." BiALOs & HusisiAN, supra note 9, at 36.
41. It is important to note that the plan to bribe does not have to actually grow to
fruition. Liability is triggered when action "in furtherance" of the plan is taken. BIALOS
& HUSIAN, supra note 9, at 32-33.
42. Bribes paid to private individuals are not covered by the FCPA.
43. BIALOS & HusisiAN, supra note 9, 29 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994)
(issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994) (domestic concerns)). With respect to the sixth part,
it has been said that situations where action is taken "with the expectation of a profit"
meet this requirement. BILkos & HusIsiAN, supra note 9, at 34. It is not necessary to
make the payments in hopes of gaining business with a foreign government. The
important element of this requirement is that the payment was made to a foreign official,
party, or office. BIALOS & HUsiSLAN, supra note 9, 34-35.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/3
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In addition, the FCPA prohibits payments made to third parties "while
knowing" that the money will be used to make payments prohibited by the act."
"Knowing" is said to mean that a person "is aware that such [third party] is
engaging in such conduct, that such circumstances exists, or that such result is
substantially certain to occur; or such person has a firm belief that such
circumstances exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur."45
Actual knowledge of illegality is not required.' Thus, a "conscious disregard"
of the situation will trigger liability. 47 In other words, one cannot avoid liability
by sticking one's head in the sand.
The FCPA prohibitions do not apply to payments used to facilitate "the
performance of a routine governmental action.'"8 "Routine governmental
action" is defined by the statute as follows:
[A]n action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign
official in(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify
a person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or
scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or
inspections related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities
from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.49
In other words, this exception applies to non-discretionary actions by the foreign
official-duties the official is supposed to perform anyway. Congress realized
that prohibiting U.S. companies from making such payments would put them at
a serious disadvantage because officials in many countries use such payments
to supplement their income.5" The exception does not apply to discretionary

44. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (1994)
(domestic concerns).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(A) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)
(1994) (domestic concerns).
46. BiALoS & HusIsiM.N, supra note 9, at 40.
47. BIALOS & HusIsiAN, supranote 9, at 40-41 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576,

at 919-21 (1988)).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (1994)
(domestic concerns).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(A) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)
(1994) (domestic concerns).
50. BIALos & HusisiAN, supra note 9, at 42-43.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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actions, such as the decision by a foreign official "to award new business to or
to continue business with a particular party."'
In addition to the "routine governmental action" exception, the FCPA
provides two affitnative defenses. One allows the payments to be made if they
are "lawful under the written laws' of the foreign country.52 The other allows
"reasonable and bona fide expenditure[s] ... directly related to the promotion
...ofproducts or services; or the execution or performance of a contract."53 As
examples of this second affirmative defense, the statute lists travel and lodging
expenses.54
Issuers and domestic concerns are allowed under the FCPA to ask the
Attorney General specific questions about proposed conduct. 55 The Attorney
General is then required to respond within thirty days.56 If the Attorney General
finds that certain actions are allowable under the FCPA, a rebuttable
presumption arises that such conduct is indeed in conformity with the FCPA
unless, in an enforcement hearing, it is shown otherwise by a preponderance of
the evidence.57 This procedure is restricted to questions concerning the antibribery provisions, and is not available for questions regarding the accounting
provisions."
C. Penaltiesfor Violation of the Antibribery Provisions
Criminal penalties may reach as high as two million dollars for both
issuers59 and domestic concerns.' A willful violation by the officers, directors,
employees, agents, or stockholders of an issuer or domestic concern could result

51. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B)
(1994) (domestic concerns).

52. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1) (1994)
(domestic concerns).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(2) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2) (1994)
(domestic concerns).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(2) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2) (1994)
(domestic concerns). In addition to travel and lodging expenses, food, entertainment,
and product samples have been allowed so long as the cost was reasonable and there was
adequate documentation and disclosure. BIALos & HuSiSLAN, supranote 9, at 47. It is
important to note that all payments must be closely related to the promotion of the
product in order to qualify for this defense. BIALOs & HuslsIAN, supranote 9, at 47.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(e)(1) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(f)(1) (1994)
(domestic concerns).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(e)(1) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(f)(1) (1994)
(domestic concerns).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(e)(1) (1994) (issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(f)(1) (1994)
(domestic concerns).
58. 28 C.F.R. § 80.12 (1997).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(A) (1994).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(A) (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/3
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in a fine of up to $100,000 and up to five years imprisonment.6 ' These same
individuals, as well as the company, may be assessed civil fines of no more than
ten thousand dollars. 62 The FCPA insures that any officer, director, employee,
agent, or stockholder assessed a penalty will be personally responsible for the
fine by prohibiting reimbursement by the company.63 Injunctions are also
available to prevent future violations.'
D. Penaltiesfor Violation of the Accounting Provisions
Violations of the accounting provisions can result in civil fines of no more
than one million dollars generally, although the fines may be as high as $2.5
million if there is a "willful violation." 65 Criminal penalties may only be
imposed if there is a "knowing" violation of the accounting provisions." If
criminal penalties are imposed, imprisonment may not exceed ten years.67
E. Enforcement
The SEC and the Justice Department share enforcement duties under the
FCPA. The SEC prosecutes civil violations of the accounting and antibribery
provisions as applied to issuers. 68 The Department of Justice prosecutes civil
violations by domestic concerns. 69 However, the Department of Justice has
exclusive jurisdiction in regard to criminal prosecutions, whether by a domestic
concern or an issuer.70
IV. CASES INTERPRETING THE FCPA
The practitioner will quickly learn there is a dearth of cases interpreting the
FCPA. This is not due to the unimportance of the act, but can be attributed to
the fact that most defendants settle prior to trial. Fortunately, a few cases do
make it to trial.

61. 15 U.S.C.§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), (B) (1994) (domestic concerns); 15 U.S.C. §
78ff(c)(2)(A), (B) (1994) (issuers).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), (2)(C) (1994) (domestic concerns); 15 U.S.C. §
78ff(c)(1)(B), (2)(C) (1994) (issuers).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(3) (1994).
64. 15 U.S.C.§ 78dd-2(d)(1) (1994).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78fi(a) (1994).

66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(4), (5) (1994).
67.
68.
69.
70.

BIALoS & HusIsIAN, supranote 9, at 68.
Nilsson, supra note 33, at 811.
Nilsson, supra note 33, at 811.
Nilsson, supra note 33, at 811.
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A. Gift or Bribe? UnitedStates v. Liebo7 '
Richard Liebo, the defendant, was a vice-president with NAPCO
International, Inc., a seller of military supplies and equipment.n The
government of Niger had contracted with a West German company to service
cargo planes.7" The Niger government had some financial difficulties, so the
West German company sought out an American part supplier in hopes that the
Niger project would qualify for assistance under the Foreign Military Sales
Program.74 The West German company selected NAPCO.
In order to get the President of Niger's approval, a representative from the
West German company and Liebo flew to Niger and met with the chief of
maintenance for the Niger Air Force.75 Liebo promised to make "some gestures"
to the chief if he supported the contract.76 The chief agreed and the President
signed the contract upon the chief s recommendation.7 7
Liebo later contacted the chief s cousin, an embassy official in Washington,
D.C., and told him that he wanted to make a "gesture" to the chief.7' The cousin
set up a bank account into which NAPCO deposited thirty thousand dollars.79
The cousin used this money for his personal use and gave some of it to the
chief8" Liebo, using a NAPCO credit card, also paid for part of the cousin's
honeymoon by purchasing airline tickets worth over two thousand dollars."'
NAPCO received two other contracts from the Niger government totaling
nearly three million dollars.' Among other charges,83 Liebo was charged with
violating the FCPA.84 He was eventually acquitted of all the charges except the
FCPA charge relating to the honeymoon airline tickets."5

71. 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).

72. Id. at 1309.
73. Id.
74. Id. The program provides loans to countries who buy from American
contractors. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1309-10.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1310.
Id.
Id.
Liebo was charged with fraud, falsifying tax .returns, and making false
statements to the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Id. at 1310 n.1.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1310. The charge of making false statements was tied to the FCPA
charge. Id. In order to get the assistance loan, Liebo had to certify to the agency that no
gifts contrary to United States law had been given to a foreign official in connection with
the contract. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/3
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On appeal, Liebo argued there was not enough evidence to show that he had
given the tickets "to obtain or retain business." 86 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed.87 The President ofNiger would not sign contracts without
the chief's approval. 8 There was also evidence that the chief and his cousin
were best friends. 89 It was therefore reasonable for the jury to believe the tickets
were bought to gain the chief s recommendation to the President.9"
Liebo also argued there was insufficient evidence to show he acted
"corruptly." 91 Liebo asserted the tickets were bought as a gift, not intended to
cause the cousin to abuse his position.92 The court once again found the jury's
determination reasonable.93 The court noted that the tickets were bought just
prior to the third contract being awarded. 4 Once again, the relationship between
the cousin and the chief, as well as that between the chief and the President, was
an important factor.95 Finally, Liebo's classification of the tickets as a
"commission payment" helped the court find that the jury's verdict was based
on sufficient evidence. 96
Liebo also contested the jury instruction as not distinguishing between a gift
and a bribe.97 Once again, the court disagreed, finding the instruction
sufficient.98
However, Liebo did actually win on one point. The court granted a new
trial because of new evidence discovered after his conviction.99 A memo
surfaced tending to prove Liebo's actions were approved by NAPCO's
president."0 Liebo argued this evidence was important because he had been
acquitted on all counts where it was shown that NAPCO's president or another
superior approved the action taken.1"' Indeed, the jury specifically asked if there

86. Id. at 1311.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

91. Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1312.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The judge instructed the jury "corruptly" meant "the offer, promise to pay,

payment or authorization ofpayment, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse
his official position or to influence someone else to do so" and that "an act is 'corruptly'
done if done voluntarily [a]nd intentionally, and with a bad purpose of accomplishing
either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or
means." Id.
99. Id. at 1314.
100. Id. at 1312-13.
101. Id. at 1313.
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was any evidence of approval of the tickets.'02 The Eighth Circuit concluded
that the jury considered such evidence to be crucial and consequently ordered a
new trial. 3
B. Act ofState Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue ofwhether the act of
state doctrine barred actions brought by a competitor against a company that pled
guilty to making payments in violation of the FCPA in order to gain a contract.'
The case, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. EnvironmentalTectonics Corporation,
5
International,"
involved a contract for a medical center at an air force base in
°
Nigeria." Kirkpatrick made a deal with a Nigerian national whereby Nigerian
officials would receive a "commission" if the contract was awarded to the
company. 7 The contract was in fact awarded to Kirkpatrick." Environmental
Tectonics, a competitor for the same contract, notified the U.S. government upon
learning of Kirkpatrick's scheme."° Kirkpatrick was charged with violation of
the FCPA and plead guilty.1 '
The facts qualifying Kirkpatrick for a FCPA violation also qualified him for
a violation under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, an
act which allows for private causes of action."' Environmental Tectonics
brought such an action against Kirkpatrick. 12 Kirkpatrick countered by asserting
that the act of state doctrine prevented a finding in favor of Environmental
Tectonics."' Kirkpatrick reasoned that Environmental Tectonics could win only
if it showed the contract was entered into as a result of the bribery of Nigerian
officials.11 4 These facts would require a court to find the contract invalid under

102. Id.

103. Id. at 1314.
104. The act of state doctrine was created by the Supreme Court in Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where the Court stated "[e]very sovereign state is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory." Id. at 252. For example, in order for the plaintiff to win in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Court would have been
required to find Cuba's expropriation ofplaintiff's goods located in Havana invalid. Id.
at 427-37. This the Court refused to do. Id. at 437.
105. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
106. Id. at401.
107. Id. at 402.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 406.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/3

12

Johnson: Johnson: Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:

1998]

FOREIGNCORRUPTPRACTICESACT

Nigerian law.'1 5 In other words, Kirkpatrick argued that a court would be forced
to find a foreign government's action invalid and that this finding would be a
clear violation of the act of state doctrine.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority of the Court, disagreed with
Kirkpatrick's assessment." 6 Scalia found it unnecessary for a court to decide
whether or not the contract was valid under Nigerian law." 7 A court need only
look at the defendant's acts leading up to the contract and decide whether they
violate U.S. law. Whether or not the resulting contract is valid under Nigerian
law is not an issue. Because an act of the Nigerian government was not at issue,
the act of state doctrine did not apply." 8
C. PrivateRight ofAction
The implication doctrine was first enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby." 9 The Court found that when a
defendant violates a statute thereby harming one of the members of the class of
people intended to benefit by the statute, a private right of action was implied
even though not specified in the statute. 20

In Cort v. Ash,' 2 ' the Court

established a four part test to determine whether or not the implication doctrine
applied.2 2 This test considered the following factors:
(1) whether the plaintiffs are among "the class for whose special
benefit" the statute was enacted; (2) whether the legislative history
suggests congressional intent to prescribe or proscribe a private cause
of action; (3) whether "implying such a remedy for the plaintiff would
be 'consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme'; and (4) whether the cause of action is "one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so
''
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action. 23
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court modified the test, finding congressional
intent to be the paramount factor.1

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Id. at 409-10.
119. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
120. Id. at 39-40.
121. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

122. Id. at 78.
123. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing
Chairez v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 790 F.2d 544, 546 (6th
Cir. 1986)).
124. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); Cannon v.
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The notion that the FCPA creates a private right of action has been rejected
by every court to consider the issue. The Sixth Circuit found in Lamb v. Phillip
Morris, Inc." that competitors of the defendants were not the intended
beneficiaries of the FCPA 2 6 Instead, the court found "the FCPA was primarily
intended to protect the integrity of American foreign policy."' 7 The court
discovered only one reference to private causes of actions in the legislative
history of the FCPA.'2 This was not enough to mandate recognition of a private
cause of action in the opinion of the court.'29 The court also felt that implying
a private right would be inconsistent with the FCPA because the act showed a
preference for compliance as opposed to prosecution. 3 Though the court
conceded a private cause of action would not impinge on the providence of the
states, the court noted the availability of other statutory rights of redress such as
the Sherman Act. '' The court's evaluation of the Cort
a2 factors led it to hold that
no private cause of action exists under the FCPA
Although other courts have disagreed as to the intended beneficiaries of the
FCPA,' the analysis of the Cort factors has always resulted in a finding of no
private cause of action."3 Consequently, it appears unlikely that a private party
will ever be able to establish a private cause of action.
D. Foreign Officials
Only one case has addressed the issue ofwhether foreign officials may be
prosecuted under the FCPA' 35 In that case, the Fifth Circuit held foreign

University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-709 (1979).
125. 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
126. Id. at 1029.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1029-30.
131. Id. at 1030.
132. Id. For an opposing view, see Witter, supranote 7.
133. See J.S. Serv.Ctr. Corp. v. General Elec. Technical Servs. Co., 937 F. Supp.
216,226 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. Western Oil &Ref. Co., 771 F.
Supp. 600, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court in both of these cases felt a violating
company's competitors were the intended beneficiaries of the FCPA. J.S. Serv. Ctr., 937
F. Supp. at 226; Citicorp 771 F. Supp. at 606.
134. J.S. Serv. Cr., 937 F. Supp. at 227; Citicorp,771 F. Supp. at 607. In J.S.
Service Center,the defendant's distributor was bringing the suit. 937 F. Supp. at 226.
Because the distributor was not technically a competitor of the defendant, the court found
the plaintiff was not part of class intended to be protected by the FCPA. Id. In Citicorp,
the court found the plaintiff did not fall within the class intended to be protected by the
FCPA. 771 F. Supp. at 606-07.
135. See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991).
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officials to be beyond the reach of the FCPA. 36 The court found in the FCPA
"an affirmative legislative policy to leave unpunished a well-defined group of
persons who were necessary parties to the acts constituting a violation of the
substantive law."'37 Though this is the only case to address the issue, the fact
that foreign officials are left out of the extensive list of people identified in the
FCPA as potential defendants makes it likely other courts will reach a similar
conclusion.

V. THE FCPA rN CouNTRES LIKE RussIA AND CHINA
U.S. companies face the challenge of doing business in transitional
economies, such as Russia, or in developing economies, such as China, while
avoiding liability under the FCPA. The issues faced by a company in these types
of economies are similar and will, therefore, be addressed together.
FCPA liability in these economies is often a risk because the American
company generally has either hired a foreign agent or the company is part of
joint-venture in the foreign country.' Foreign agents are often unaware of the
FCPA. Because bribery is common in many countries, the agent may very well
make payments prohibited by the act. 39 In regard to joint-ventures, the U.S.
company may be a minority shareholder without the ability to control the foreign
company's business operations. 140 In such a situation, the U.S. company would
probably not be prosecuted under the FCPA "if it did not direct, control, or
'know' of any bribery schemes.'' Even if the U.S. company owns a majority
of the equity shares, it may not have much actual control over the company."
Because foreign subsidiaries are not directly governed by the FCPA,'43 it is
possible a scheme violative of the FCPA conceived and executed by the
subsidiary behind the U.S. parent's back would not expose the parent to

136. Id. at 831.
137. Id. at 836.
138. See Delia Poon, Note, Exposure to the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct: A
Guidefor U.S. Companies with Activities in the People'sRepublic of Chinato Minimize
Liability, 19 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 327,337-38 (1996); see also Christopher
F. Dugan &Vladimir L. Lechtman, In Russia,Bribe Ban is CausingDificulties,NAT'L

L. J., October 7, 1996, at C1.
139. Poon, supra riote 138, at 337.
140. Poon, supra note 138, at 337.
141. Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA in Russia and Other
FormerCommunist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 378, 381 (1997).
142. Poon, supra note 138, at 337.
143. Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 141, at 381 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-

831, at 14 (1977)).
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liability.'" However, there will be close scrutiny as to whether the U.S. parent
went along with the scheme."'
One major problem in both China and Russia is distinguishing between a
foreign official and private individual. 4 6 This problem is created by state
ownership of enterprises.'4 7 Though Russia is in the process of privatization,
many enterprises have not reached the final stage of privatization.'48 Therefore,
U.S. companies do not know whether the manager of an enterprise is a foreign
official or someone not contemplated by the FCPA.
The FCPA defines "foreign official" to mean "any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentalitythereof, or
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government
or department, agency, or instrumentality.""'9 Unfortunately, neither the FCPA
nor case law define "agency or instrumentality." This has led commentators to
turn to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which provides
a statutory definition of "agency or instrumentality."' 5 Under the FSIA, a
business is a government "instrumentality" or "agency" if the majority of its
shares are owned by the government. ' For example, if the Russian or Chinese
government owned fifty-one percent of an enterprise, that enterprise would be
part of the government. Therefore, it is believed that a manager of such a facility
would be52considered a "foreign official," triggering the possibility of FCPA
liability.1
U.S. companies often want to hire a well-connected government official
who knows his or her way through the bureaucratic red tape and has the ability
to drum up business. In this scenario, the official's own office is not used to
benefit the U.S. company. Instead, the official uses his connections with friends
in the government to help the U.S. company or, the official uses his or her office
to obtain non-governmental business. In these situations, the question is whether
the payments to the official are made "corruptly," thereby resulting in a violation
of the FCPA. 53 The Department of Justice has intimated that factors relevant to

144. Dugan & Lechtman, supranote 141, at 381-82.
145. Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 141, at 382.
146. See Poon, supra note 138, at 343; see also Dugan & Lechtman, supranote
141, at 382.
147. Dugan & Lechtman, supranote 141, at 382.
148. Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 141, at 382.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1) (1994) (issuers) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd2(h)(2) (1994) (domestic concerns) (emphasis added).
150. Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 141, at 383. See also BIALOs & HUSislAN,
supranote 9, at 110; Poon, supranote 138, at 343-44.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b) (1994).
152. BIALOS &HusislAN, supranote 9, at 110-12; Dugan & Lechtman, supranote
141, at 384; Poon, supranote 138, at 344.
153. Dugan & Lechtman, supranote 141, at 386. For a definition of"corrupt," see
supra note 38.
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this determination are "the official's position, the extent to which he relies on it
to obtain the business, and the amount of money he receives for his services."'"
Consequently, it may not be wise for a company to hire an official with an
extremely high position in the government.' 55 The Department of Justice may
well be inclined to find any efforts by such an official to aid the U.S. company
as a misuse of his or her position.
VI. AVOIDING FCPA PROBLEMS
Developing a compliance program is probably the most effective way for
a company to avoid liability under the FCPA. 156 Such programs not only
cultivate "due diligence" on the part of the company, but can actually lead to a
reduced fine in the case of a violation.'57 It stands to reason that senior
management in companies must make compliance a priority if a compliance
program is to be effective. If individuals are promoted based exclusively on the
money they earn for the company without regard to possible FCPA violations,
there will be no incentive for employees to concern themselves with the FCPA.
The United States Sentencing Commission has determined an effective
compliance program consists of the following seven elements:
(i) written compliance standards and procedures;
(ii) senior level personnel assigned overall responsibility for
compliance;
(iii) use due care not to delegate authority to individuals whose
company knew or should have known had propensity for illegal
activities;
(iv) communicate standards through training programs or
disseminating written materials;
(v) the company should implement procedures to achieve compliance,
such as a monitoring and auditing system to deter violations, and a
process for employers to report violations by others without fear of
retribution;
(vi) appropriate disciplinary procedures for a violation; and
(vii) after a violation has been detected, taking appropriate steps to
respond, and to prevent similar violations in the future, including
modifications to its Compliance program.'

154. Dugan & Lechtman, supranote 141, at 386-87.
155. Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 141, at 387.

156. Don Zarin, Doing Business Under The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
CompliancePrograms,943 PLI/CoRi' 525, 529 (1996).
157. Id. at 529-30.
158. Id. at 532 n.6 (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMM'N, GUIDELINES
MANUAL

§ 8A1.2 crnt. 3(k) (1997)).
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One author suggests the promulgation of a policy statement by the president
of the company, as well as the development of a compliance committee in charge
of training employees and preparing a manual on ethics. 59 Though not required
by the FCPA, domestic concerns should maintain sufficiently detailed records
and may want to consider creating an audit committee in charge of enforcing
company policy."6°
When dealing in countries such as Russia and China, the U.S. company
should be very careful in choosing a partner or agent. 61 The process of choosing
a partner or agent in a foreign country should be well documented and based on
merit rather than "connections."' 62 Upon hiring a foreign agent, the foreign
government should be notified of the appointment and anything that may suggest
bribery (such as relationship to government officials) should be disclosed.
U.S. companies should draft their contracts with foreign agents and partners
in such a way that the contracts are contingent upon compliance with the FCPA
and that a violation of the FCPA will excuse the U.S. company from the
contract. 1" The U.S. company should try to include a clause providing for
indemnification in case the foreign agent or partner's actions result in liability
for the U.S. company."
Finally, it can only help a company to submit any questions to the Attorney
General under the opinion procedure of the FCPA in those instances where an
action may or may not be prohibited. A company with the approval of the
Attorney General
may take action with the knowledge it has some protection
6
from liability.'

VII. CONCLUSION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a possible pitfall of which companies
doing business abroad should be aware. The act is very broad, covering virtually
every business in the United States (in fact it is hard to imagine what business
could escape its scope). Violations can result in large fines and imprisonment.
However, there are some steps businesses can take to minimize exposure. Of
these, education of employees may very well be the most important.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can make doing business in transitional
or developing economies where bribery is rampant especially difficult. And,
until other countries adopt laws similar to the FCPA, U.S. businesses are at a

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 532-35.
Id. at 536
Poon, supranote 138, at 348.
Poon, supranote 138, at 348-49.
Poon, supranote 138, at 349-50.
Poon, supranote 138, at 350-51.
Poon, supranote 138, at 351.
For a discussion of the opinion procedure, see supra notes 53-56.
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seeming disadvantage to foreign competitors. There are some indications,
however, that the day may be coming when the United States is no longer the
lone soldier in the fight against bribery of foreign officials.
J. LEE JOHNSON
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